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Civ-mil in Danger? Blame the pundits, not the academies. 
By George Fust | 06 August 2019 
I teach civil-military relations at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. While searching for 
readings for an elective course taught in the spring semester, I came across a 2010 article written 
in the L.A. Times, “An increasingly politicized military.” One passage stood out:  
“By all accounts, the curricula of the service academies and the war colleges give 
remarkably little attention to the central importance of civilian control. They do not 
systematically expose up-and-coming officers to intensive case studies and simulations 
designed to give them a sense of the principle’s real-world implications.”  
So where are we now? Nearly a decade later, those cadets have graduated and are now mid-
career officers. Do civilians have less control over the military as a result of the claim that the 
military received poor instruction on proper civ-mil relations? Can curriculum “fix” broken civil-
military relations? Curriculum can inform and inspire but it is not the keeper of the culture. The 
academies, and the military itself, have developed a unique conception of professionalism. The 
belief in service and placing the country above one’s own need reinforces healthy civil-military 
relations. Those who join the military’s ranks don’t require academic literature and theory to 
understand their role in the system. As evidence, the majority of officers who commission into 
the military (around 80%) do so through R.O.T.C. This commissioning source does not have any 
curricula on the importance of civilian control and yet, the system works.   
To an outside observer seeking to determine a cause for weakened civil control, the academies 
are a logical starting point. To an insider, it is misguided. The halls of the academy are lined with 
portraits of civilian leaders. Congressmen and other officials are routinely invited as guests of 
honor. The history of famous generals is kept alive at the academies. This includes the 
knowledge and circumstances of incidences of military insubordination. A discussion of 
MacArthur always includes the reasons he was fired by President Truman. Bring up General 
Pershing and a cadet will know why he overstepped his role as a military leader at the end of 
WWI. General Colin Powell can also be invoked with a conversation about the inappropriate 
political nature of the Powell Doctrine sure to follow. Say something about General Stanley 
McChrystal and you will surely get reverence as a response. However, you will also get regret at 
his violation of healthy civil-military practice.  
In all these examples, cadets at the academy regret that the incident occurred. They are angered 
that a military leader would so blatantly violate civil-military norms. The academies meet the 
discussion of civilian control head on. Hallway conversations surrounding a retired general’s 
participation in politics is a routine occurrence. Cadets grapple with the implications of these 
actions. It only takes a year or two for most to understand the importance of a non-partisan 
military. And this happens before their formal curriculum on civil-military relations.  
By the time I receive second-year cadets most of them already know the expected answer for 
proper civil-military relations. They often don’t know why they believe what they do, but that’s 
how indoctrination works. It is difficult during class discussions to have cadets play devil’s 
advocate and argue against military subordination. Afterall, why should the guys with the all the 
guns obey those privileged politicians without any? Because, the cadets argue, “that’s how it is 
in America.” Service academy curricula on civil-military relations thus has the effect of 
providing evidence to support an argument the cadets already knew to be true. They can speak 
intelligently about Huntington, and Feaver, and Washington’s Newburgh Address but their true 
belief and understanding comes from the engrained military culture that surrounds them. The 
pressure to conform is constant. This includes the idea that civilians are in control.  
The author of the 2010 L.A. Times article may have been correct that the curricula were lacking 
(although this too is a stretch), but they missed the point. This is not a civil-military relations 
issue. It is a political one. The pundits, not the military are to blame.  
In December of last year, my colleague, Mike Robinson published an article titled “What the 
Mattis resignation tells us about how Trump is damaging the military’s credibility.” He suggests 
“how difficult it is to keep the military looking nonpartisan in the age of ‘Trump’s generals.’” 
Mike’s framework for the discussion, like the L.A. Times article, is misdirected. He applies a 
civil-military relations lens when the discussion has always been a political one. The constant 
suggestion that any action involving a retired general is somehow related to civil-military 
relations is the cause of erosion in the relationship. Anyone in the orbit of the inner circles of 
D.C. is inherently political, especially those appointed to senior positions in the administration. 
This most definitely includes retired military generals. 
The American public’s default is to associate anything in Washington D.C. (and certainly the 
upper echelons of the Administration) as political, not military. Retired general officers who 
have recently been in the spotlight, such as Kelly, Mattis, or Flynn, were acting in political 
positions within the Executive Branch. Even H.R. McMaster who served as the National Security 
Advisor while on active duty was serving in a political advisor role. His actions while in this 
position did not represent the military writ large. Pundits who decried the cadre of generals 
surrounding the President as a threat to civil-military relations created an issue where there was 
none. Again, the average American citizen does not associate political appointees’ actions as 
representative of the military until they are told to.  
The resignations of “Trump’s generals” were subsequently personal decisions, not military ones. 
Secretary Mattis fundamentally disagreed with the policy outlined by his boss and thus resigned. 
His resignation letter outlines his policy disagreement and in no way should be attributed to the 
military.  
Ultimately, the President is the decider on policy. He is the elected representative of the 
American people. The Constitution grants him the roles of both head of state and commander in 
chief. His role is therefore to make foreign policy choices and to direct strategy. Those in his 
cabinet who disagree with his directives or vision have the option of resigning. If U.S. policy is 
wrong, the blame inherently lies with the American people. They get to decide at a future 
election how to proceed. The military however, does not have the right to resign. At present, 
there is no evidence to suggest the military has refused to comply with an order. Recent 
examples, such as the General McChrystal case highlighted in the 2010 article, demonstrate the 
health of the relationship, not its weakness. The U.S. version of civil-military relations is still 
intact. The only thing the military is partisan about is national security. Their bias lies in keeping 
America safe. The actions of individuals should not represent the institution as a whole.    
If an increasing politicization of the military is occurring, the academies are not to blame. The 
academies are more representative of the population than ever before. The most recent 
graduating class is the most diverse in the history of the academy. Research published in Armed 
Forces and Society in 2012 demonstrates “a relatively disperse distribution of ideological 
leanings among its members, which if anything, can be characterized as moderate, if not 
somewhat liberal, in nature.” This evidence runs counter to the notion that the academies are 
increasingly becoming affiliated with one political party or are encouraging partisanship as 
suggested in the 2010 L.A. Times article.  
 
I teach civil-military relations at the U.S. Military Academy. Every cadet is required, without 
exception, to take SS202: American Politics. During this course, multiple lessons are dedicated 
exclusively to ensuring future military officers understand the central importance of civilian 
control. They are tested on their ability to demonstrate an understanding of U.S. civil-military 
theory. But it doesn’t end there. Cadets are required to learn and explain the political activities 
they are authorized or prohibited from performing according to Army Regulations. This is in 
alignment with one of the five primary outcomes of the American Politics Program in the 
Department of Social Sciences that it will educate, train, and inspire cadets to: “characterize U.S. 
civil-military relations by emphasizing the roles, responsibilities, and culture of the military 
profession.” Elsewhere at the Academy, cadets will also interact with civil-military relations. 
The history department will reinforce historical vignettes, the legal studies department will offer 
legal implications, the Modern War Institute will host panels and speakers on the subject. All of 
these inputs help reinforce the cultural identity that the military is subordinate to civilian control.  
 
The academies are not to blame for the politicization of the military.  Pundits and politicians are. 
If you still doubt this, come sit on my class in the spring. I’m confident America’s future officers 
will convince you otherwise.  
